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also refers the reader to two excellent
articles on this subject by Kenneth
Grinstead and Donald J. Petersen.2
Consider the following three scenarios
and what they have in common.  In
Scenario 1, a long-term employee with
a good employment record engaged in
a verbal altercation with a supplier
who  complained to the employer about
the employee’s attitude.  Generally,
such conduct would warrant dis-
charge, but the employee explained
that he had just learned that his
father was terminally ill and some-
thing the supplier said hit a raw
nerve. The employer understands that
this conduct was totally out of
character for the employee.
In Scenario 2, a  ten year employee
developed an attendance problem.  At
least once a week she arrived ten to
thirty minutes late. She accrued ten
one-day absences in the past three
months, for which she was disciplined
three times.  She was finally dismissed
for not returning to work after lunch
without notifying her supervisor.
During the handling of her grievance,
the union business agent reported
that the employee admitted to him to
being an alcoholic and that she had
begun attending AA meetings. This
condition, which she want to get underINSIDE
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I. Introduction
by Barry E. Simon
Last Chance Agreements: Shape Up or Ship Out
II. Creating the Last Chance
 Agreement
In the past fifteen years, employers
and unions have made increasingly
greater use of agreements designed to
give an employee who engaged in
conduct that would otherwise warrant
dismissal an opportunity to remain
employed, subject to certain condi-
tions.1   These agreements, known as
“last chance agreements,” have gener-
ated a body of arbitral decisions that
offer guidance as to their creation and
enforcement.  As with any analysis of
arbitration awards, the reader must
consider that arbitrators often differ
with one another in their decisions.
Unlike court decisions, arbitration
awards are binding only upon the
parties to the case.  As to other parties,
they may be persuasive but they are
not precedential.
This article was inspired by a
panel chaired by the author at the 2005
Fall Education Conference of the
National Academy of Arbitrators.
Comments by the management and
union advocates on the panel, and
more particularly by the Academy
members in the audience, reflect that
there are few, if any, universally
accepted principles in the creation and
enforcement of last chance agree-
ments.  The purpose of this article is to
make the reader aware of where those
differences of opinion lie.  The author
control, was the underlying cause of
her attendance problems.
In Scenario 3, a  truck driver
with two years of service failed a
random drug test when his urine
tested positive for marijuana.  His
supervisor called him in to discuss
the results of the drug test, and the
employee asked that his union
steward be present.  The supervisor
told him that he didn’t need his
steward and refused to make the
steward available.  The employee
told his supervisor that he was at a
party over the weekend where
marijuana was used.  At the end of
the meeting, the supervisor fired the
employee.  The union  grieved and
argued that the dismissal was
flawed because the grievant was
denied his Weingarten rights.3
Each scenario presents an
opportunity for a resolution that will
prevent or settle a grievance and
correct the employee’s behavior.
This resolution is generally referred
to as a “last chance agreement”
(LCA), even though it might not
necessarily be agreed upon.  The
LCA typically is an acknowledg-
ment that the employee committed
an offense that would ordinarily
warrant discharge, but circum-
stances dictate that a lesser penalty
be imposed with the understanding
that future offenses of that nature
would, with certainty, result in
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discharge.
Employers enter into LCAs for
numerous reasons.  For example,  the
employer may prefer to retain an
employee who may benefit the
employer if the employee is rehabili-
tated.  In some cases, such as Scenario
3, the employer may feel that
dismissal might not be upheld in
arbitration, but may wish to lay the
groundwork for a more supportable
discharge the next time the employee
misbehaves. Employees and their
unions may accept LCAs because they
desire to maintain the employment
relationship. Even when the union
believes it could overturn the dis-
missal in arbitration, it might urge
the employee to accept an LCA at an
early stage of the grievance process
because it would be a safer option and,
if it offers immediate reinstatement,
would minimize the employee’s losses.
Because the LCA most often is
preceded by the employee’s dismissal,
the employer should ensure that the
agreement settles all claims arising
from the dismissal.  In addition to a
grievance under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, the dismissal may
have created a cause of action under
some statutory provision, such as an
equal employment law. In the
agreement, the employee should
explicitly waive any claim of any
nature arising from the dismissal.
Where such a waiver is obtained, a
large employer should be sure that all
persons who might handle employ-
ment related claims are aware of the
waiver.
Last chance agreements are most
typically used in cases involving
absenteeism or substance abuse.  In
these cases it is clear what the
employer is attempting to accomplish
and it is fairly easy to set specific
objective requirements that the
employee must meet to remain on the
payroll. Where the employee has
attendance problems, the LCA might
establish a maximum number of
absences allowed during a specified
time period. The LCA  may explicitly
state that any absence above the
maximum will result in dismissal.4
In substance abuse cases, the
employer may direct the employee to
be evaluated by a counselor and
comply with whatever treatment
recommendations are made. To en-
sure compliance, the LCA may require
the employee to submit to unan-
nounced drug or alcohol testing.  Any
positive test or failure to submit to
testing would be grounds for dis-
charge.  Some cases present hybrid
situations, where attendance prob-
lems stem from substance abuse or
other disorders, and are not merely a
reflection of poor work habits or
Barry E. Simon has been an arbitrator in
the public and private sectors since 1989.
Prior to that, he had been Labor Counsel
for the Chicago and North Western
Transportation Company and a Personnel
Specialist for the American Library
Association’s Office for Library Personnel
Resources.  From 1990 to 2003, he also
served as an Adjunct Professor at the Lake
Forest Graduate School of Management,
teaching Human Resources Management
and Negotiations.  Mr. Simon is listed on the
arbitration panels of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the American
Arbitrator Association, the National Media-
tion Board, the Illinois Labor Relations
Board and the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board.  He is a member of the
National Academy of Arbitrators, the
American Bar Association, the Chicago Bar
Association (Chair of Labor and Employ-
ment Law Committee, 1991-1992), the
Northwest Suburban Bar Association and
the Labor and Employment Relations
Association. One of the founding members
of the National Association of Railroad
Referees, he is the incoming President.
attitudes.  In such circumstances, the
LCA may describe a course of
treatment, and make the employee’s
compliance with the treatment pro-
gram a condition of continued
employment.5   In any case, the LCA
should clearly describe the conditions
that the employee must satisfy to
retain an employment status, or those
circumstances that will warrant
discharge.  LCA conditions for an
employee with a substance abuse
problem might read as follows:
1. Within ten days of the date of
this agreement, the employee will
schedule a meeting for an
evaluation by the Employee
Assistance Program counselor.
The employee will agree to a
treatment program as prescribed
by the counselor.
2. The employee will participate in
any rehabilitation programs pre-
scribed.  If in-patient or out-patient
programs are prescribed, the
employee will successfully com-
plete them. If attendance at a
twelve-step program is prescribed,
the employee will attend as
frequently as directed by the
counselor.  The employee will meet
with the counselor at prescribed
intervals.
3. The employee will refrain from
using alcohol and drugs other than
those prescribed for him by a
physician.
4. The employee will submit to
urine and/or breath testing at
times directed by the employer.
Any positive test or refusal to
submit to testing will be consid-
ered a violation of this agreement.
5. Any violation of these conditions
within two years of the date of this
agreement will result in the
employee’s immediate discharge.6
 Stating that the failure to comply
with the terms of the LCA will result
in dismissal truly creates finality.
Even though the agreement uses the
term “last chance,” if it states only
that the employee may be dismissed,
the agreement will give an arbitrator
discretion as to the quantum of
discipline. The vague language im-
Mr. Simon has a B.S. in Management from
the University of Illinois-Chicago and a J.D.
from Loyola University School of Law.
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III. Parties to the Agreement
plies the employee will be subject to
discipline, up to and including
dismissal.  In one case, where the LCA
stated that any violation “will result in
disciplinary action, up to and
including termination,” the arbitrator
reduced a dismissal to a three day
suspension, the penultimate step in
the disciplinary progression, finding
that the employee’s failure to clock in
and out was not an egregious
violation.7
Arbitrators sometimes face last
chance agreements that are not  really
last chances.  When the employer tells
the arbitrator that the employee has
already failed to live up to an earlier
last chance agreement, questions are
raised as to what the instant LCA
means.  Is it a final last chance or just
another next-to-last chance?  When an
employer chooses not to discharge the
violator, the employee might be given
a false sense of security, thinking
either that the employer has acqui-
esced to poor performance or has
waived the right to discharge under
the LCA.  One arbitrator explained:
If the employee who is subject to
the LCA violates the LCA and is
consequently terminated, she had
proper warning.  If the employee
violates the LCA and nothing
happens, the notice provisions of
the LCA are diluted and the
employee must again be put on
notice that additional violations
will subject her to termination.
Without such a requirement, an
employer would be free to “strike”
anytime.8
Management may respond to this
argument by asserting it exercised
leniency by giving the employee
greater latitude than the LCA
required. If that is the case, the
arbitrator may consider how, if at all,
that was communicated to the
employee. Management may also
argue that it granted an employee
additional absences before invoking
the LCA as insurance against a
finding that one or more of the
absences should not have been counted
against the employee.  This argument
may be persuasive, but only to a
limited extent.  For example, if the
LCA may be invoked after five
absences, but the employee has
accumulated twenty before being
dismissed, the employer may have
over-insured.
Last chance agreements are enforce-
able in the same manner as the
collective bargaining agreement.9
Rarely will an arbitrator find an LCA
to be unenforceable, but certain
standards have emerged.  First, the
LCA should be signed by an employer
representative, a union representative
and the employee.  The employee’s
signature would counter any argu-
ment that the employee was unaware
of the agreement or its terms.10  The
union should be a party to the LCA
because some arbitrators consider an
LCA to be an amendment or
supplement to the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Arguably, the execu-
tion of an LCA to which the union was
not a signatory constitutes direct
dealing or indivividual bargaining
with the employee, which is an unfair
labor practice. In a case where the
employer had denied the grievant’s
request for union representation, an
arbitrator, citing J. I. Case v. NLRB,11
refused to enforce the LCA and held,
“These special agreements are proper
only when undertaken under the
auspices of the collective bargaining
process.”12
From a practical standpoint, the
union’s participation in the execution
of the LCA makes the union a partner
in working with the employee to
ensure compliance with the
agreement’s conditions.  Because the
union generally favors an LCA as an
alternative to an employee’s dismissal,
it has a vested interest in the
employee’s success in meeting the
conditions of the LCA.  In a work
environment where LCAs have not
been successful in rehabilitating
employees, the employer may become
reluctant to agree to them.  The
union’s role at this stage is to ensure
that the conditions imposed by the
LCA are reasonable rather than
onerous.  The representative also has a
responsibility to make sure the
employee understands the conditions,
as well as the consequences for failing
to meet them.
Some arbitrators reject the argu-
ment that the LCA is a supplemental
agreement.  The union representative,
then, need not be the one vested with
the authority to bargain the master
contract. For example, in one case, an
arbitrator dismissed the union’s argu-
ment that the LCA was invalid
because the International was party to
the contract and the grievant had been
represented in negotiating the LCA by
the president of the local rather than
an international staff representative.
The arbitrator held:
The purpose of the Union’s
involvement in the signing of a
Last Chance Agreement is to
ensure that the Grievant’s due
process and other rights are
observed, to ensure that the
Grievant’s interests are repre-
sented, and to assist the Grievant
in obtaining a clear understanding
of the LCA.  Any competent Union
officer, Steward, Vice President,
President, or Union staff represen-
tative can fill this role.13
Because many LCAs arise out of
the grievance procedure, it may be
sufficient that the agreement be
signed by any representative who has
the authority to resolve grievances.14
Where employees are permitted under
the collective bargaining agreement to
progress their own grievances, at least
to the first step of the grievance
procedure, they should be able to enter
into an LCA as a grievance settlement
without union involvement. An agree-
ment that does not involve the union,
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IV. The Right to Grieve
V. Duration of the Agree-
ment
however, cannot modify the specific
terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. For instance, the em-
ployee may not waive the grievance
and arbitration provisions of the CBA.
The union, on the other hand, is free to
agree to contractual modifications
with respect to individual employees.
While disparate treatment is not
normally a valid argument on behalf of
an employee terminated under an
LCA, it is not unusual to hear the
union argue that another employee
should not have been dismissed
because management gave last chance
agreements to similarly situated
employees who engaged in similar
misconduct.  Many LCAs state they
set no precedent for future discipline
cases and may not be cited in other
proceedings. Arbitrators typically
respect such provisions and do not
consider other employees’ receipt of
LCAs to have established a past
practice.15  Such a clause, however,
might not be effective in another
forum, such as an equal employment
proceeding.  It is binding in labor
arbitration only because the union is a
party to the agreement.
Although courts have recognized the
right of the parties to execute
agreements that waive the employee’s
grievance rights,16  there is a presump-
tion favoring the arbitrability of
grievances arising from disciplinary
actions.  Accordingly, any waiver of
the right to arbitration must be clearly
and expressly stated in the LCA.  By
agreeing that a discharge under an
LCA is not arbitrable, the parties are
effectively making the employee a
probationary employee with the
employer having sole and unlimited
discretion to terminate the employee.
Not only has the employer eliminated
the employee’s right to challenge the
quantum of discipline imposed, but it
has also removed the right to challenge
the merits of the discipline, i.e.,
whether the employee failed to meet
the conditions of the LCA.  Conse-
quently, it should be established that
the employee and the union knowingly
consented to such a waiver.
Most arbitrators, though, reject
any condition in an LCA which forfeits
any right of the grievance procedure,
assuring the grievant a “day in court,”
and require the employer to prove that
the employee violated the LCA.17  In
addition to arbitrators adhering to the
concepts of fundamental fairness and
due process, arbitrators look to the
source of their jurisdiction over the
grievance and their authority as
arbitrators. That authority is derived
from the grievance/arbitration provi-
sions of the collective bargaining
agreement, and not the LCA.18
Therefore, arbitrators may be more
likely to find the general provisions of
the grievance procedure to be
controlling.
Employers, aware of the fragility
of their position that the right to grieve
may be waived, may be reluctant to
pursue such an argument.  For
example, in one case, an LCA condition
read, “You agree not to file any
grievances, lawsuits or claims of any
nature against the Company which in
any way relate to a discharge action as
a result of this agreement.”  Despite
this language, the employer argued,
against the Union’s position that such
language rendered the LCA void and
unenforceable, “Under the last chance
agreement, the arbitrator’s authority
is limited, and only extends to a
determination of whether the grievant
violated a company rule or standard.”
Undoubtedly because the employer
was not challenging the arbitrability
of the grievance, the arbitrator upheld
the company’s position that his
jurisdiction was limited rather than
non-existent.19 Because of this prevail-
ing trend among arbitrators, employ-
ers would be best advised not to make
a waiver of the right to progress a
grievance through arbitration a
condition of an LCA.
In his article, Donald J. Petersen
tabulated the duration clauses of the
agreements cited in the arbitration
cases he reviewed.  Noting that not all
of the cases mentioned time limits, he
found that a one year or six month
term seemed to be preferred.  Of the
fifteen agreements he was able to
review, seven had a life of one year,
three were for six months, and there
was one each for ninety days and two
years.  Two of the agreements were
effective for a “reasonable” period of
time and one had no expiration.20
In the author’s experience, the
duration of a last chance agreement is
generally related to the underlying
reason for the LCA.  In attendance
cases, the objective is to develop better
habits for the employees.  Sometimes a
review of the employee’s attendance
record may indicate patterns that
might influence the duration of the
LCA.  For instance, with an employee
whose absenteeism increases during
the summer (such as on days the Cubs
are at Wrigley Field), an agreement
that encompasses that period of time
would be appropriate.  Recognizing
that arbitrators rarely, if ever, see
those instances where an LCA has
been effective in correcting employee
behavior, it has been the author’s
observation that many agreements
with attendance requirements are
breached by the employee in the first
couple of months of the agreement.  It
is not unusual, though, for an
employee to maintain satisfactory
attendance for an extended period of
time, and develop problems only
toward the end of the agreement.
LCAs originating from substance
abuse problems tend to have longer
durations. Typically, such agree-
ments follow a discharge for use,
possession, or being under the
5
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VI. Arbitral Review - The
“Just Cause” Standard
influence of drugs or alcohol.  Some,
however, may be the result of a
dismissal for absenteeism or other
performance related problems where
the root cause is a substance abuse
problem.  Many of these agreements
require the employee to enter a
rehabilitation program and maintain
a level of participation in a program
such as Alcoholics Anonymous.  The
employer may also require random
unannounced testing to ensure the
employee is maintaining sobriety.  An
LCA in these instances would run long
enough to encompass a period of
sobriety that might be indicative of
success. In industries that are
particularly safety sensitive, such as
railroading, it is not unusual to see
agreements that subject the employee
to random testing for three to five
years.
In rare cases, the LCA may extend
for the term of the employee’s career
with the employer.  Scenario 1 may be
a good case for such an agreement
where the type of conduct engaged in
by the employee is never tolerated.
The purpose for extending the LCA
would be to establish that the employee
was on notice that the conduct
constituted a dismissible offense and
that leniency had already been
exercised once by the employer.  It may
also be used to circumvent a contract
provision that limits the employer’s
referral to prior discipline to a specified
period of time.  Where, for instance,
the collective bargaining agreement
prohibited the employer from referring
to prior disciplinary actions more than
three years old, the arbitrator held
that the LCA was a condition of
continued employment rather than “a
personal record of disciplinary ac-
tion.”21  Others arbitrators, however,
have held that the term of the LCA
must be reasonable, and not eternal.22
Upon the expiration of the LCA,
the employee rarely starts with a clean
slate.  Unless otherwise prohibited by
the collective bargaining agreement,
the last chance agreement may
provide a basis for supporting
discharge under the principle of
progressive discipline.  Where an
employee had again tested positive for
drugs after his one year LCA had
expired, the arbitrator held that the
agreement was evidence of notice to
the employee that he could be
discharged for drug use. The arbitra-
tor did not find it “reasonable to
conclude that the grievant has a ‘free
pass,’ after the expiration of the last
chance agreement, to resume his drug
usage.”23
In the absence of a termination
date, one arbitrator determined he was
required to construct a reasonable
termination date for the LCA.  Finding
it gave him the best guidance, he
applied the parties’ contract provision
that written warnings remain in effect
for twelve months if there is no
subsequent discipline.24
While last chance agreements are
entered into with the hope that they
will never need to be enforced, many
employees find themselves discharged
again and before an arbitrator who is
called upon to determine if the
discharge shall be upheld.  The first
question before the arbitrator is the
extent to which the arbitrator’s
authority has been limited by the LCA.
When considering discharge cases, the
issue before the arbitrator is com-
monly whether the grievant’s dis-
missal was for just cause.  The “just
cause” standard is often stated
explicitly in the collective bargaining
agreement, but even if it is not, it may
be implied in some cases.
The concept of just cause has
existed for more than half a century,
and has been defined by many
arbitrators, most famously by Carroll
R. Daugherty’s “seven tests.”25   While
many arbitrators have rejected the
“seven tests” approach, there is a
general consensus that to establish
just cause the employer must prove
some demonstrable reason for impos-
ing discipline. That reason must
concern the employee’s ability, work
performance, or conduct.  Inherent in
the definition of “just cause” are also
certain concepts of industrial due
process. The discipline must be
proportionate to the offense and
consistent with discipline imposed
upon employees with similar records.
Arbitrators have debated whether
just cause is superseded by the LCA, or
whether the standard remains. A
leading treatise comments:
Relationship to the “Just Cause”
Requirement. Depending on its
wording, the agreement may or
may not replace the just cause
requirement. Because the just
cause requirement is so funda-
mental, an arbitrator should not,
without express language, pre-
sume the parties intended to
abandon it.  If the agreement does
replace the just cause require-
ment, the arbitrator’s authority
may be limited to interpreting the
last-chance agreement itself and
determining whether the em-
ployee actually violated that
agreement.26
As a middle ground, some
arbitrators takes the approach that
just cause continues to be the standard
by which we will judge the discipline
assessed against the employee, but the
parties, through the LCA, have
defined certain elements of just
cause.27  For instance, instead of
measuring the appropriateness of the
discipline against how other employ-
ees with comparable work records
have been treated for similar offenses,
the LCA defines the discipline for this
particular employee for this particular
offense.
Most large employers have formal
rules of conduct for their employees.
Likewise, work procedures may be
codified. A typical disciplinary arbitra-
tion will include the employer’s proof of
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what behavior or performance is either
required or proscribed, and further
evidence that this was known (or
should have been known) by the
grievant.  The employer will then set
out to prove that the employee did not
behave or perform as required.
The prevailing view is that the
LCA sets out a special code of conduct
for the employee and gives notice of
what is expected.  As noted above in the
example of an LCA for substance
abuse, there may be standards of
conduct that are not imposed upon
other employees, such as complete
abstinence from alcohol.  By accepting
the LCA, the grievant and the union
have agreed that the grievant may be
treated differently from other employ-
ees with respect to the discipline
imposed for infractions covered by the
LCA.  In exchange for foregoing severe
disciplinary action or discharge, the
employer receives an unequivocal
promise that the employee will meet
special terms and conditions of
employment.28  Thus, arbitrators have
held that an LCA supersedes an
employer’s attendance policy.29
While some arbitrators have
stated they would examine the
conditions imposed upon the employee
and decline to enforce them if they
were unduly harsh or onerous, most
arbitrators would be unlikely to do so if
the LCA was agreed upon by the union.
One arbitrator wrote:
As a general rule arbitrators
support programs of salvage and
rehabilitation by strict enforce-
ment of such last chance agree-
ments in accordance with the
terms that the parties, including
the employee, have been willing to
accept.  However harsh or strict
such terms may be and even
though the arbitrator might well
regard such conditions as unfair,
that should not be his concern.
Once the arbitrator starts substi-
tuting his judgment for that of the
parties, he has exceeded his
authority and, more importantly,
has jeopardized the future use of
such agreements for such employ-
ees. . . .
An employer who has been willing
to forego assertion of its right of
termination for just cause in
return for a strict and absolute
agreement of this nature would be
extremely reluctant to take the
chance on such an agreement in
another case if arbitrators would
not give full recognition to such
agreements.  For this reason, last
chance agreements are entitled to
as much respect as the collective
bargaining agreement itself.30
Where the arbitrator unquestion-
ably has authority is the issue of
whether the LCA was violated by the
grievant.  The employer has the
burden of proving that at least one of
the conditions was not met, thereby
triggering the penalty provision of the
LCA.  The employee, then, has the
opportunity to show that the condi-
tions were satisfied, e.g., one of the
absences counted by the employer was
covered by the Family and Medical
Leave Act. The grievant’s defense,
though, may be limited.  For example,
arguments which may be available to
mitigate the severity of the discipline
in a typical just cause grievance may
be unavailable in a grievance arising
under and LCA.  One arbitrator wrote:
The last chance agreement gives
the arbitrator no authority to
apply equitable principles which
arguably, in a just cause discharge
might excuse grievant’s miscon-
duct.  A last chance agreement is,
in essence, the parties’ agreement
defining what is just cause in
respect to the grievant.31
Except where the LCA is less than
emphatic that a violation will result in
discharge, as discussed above, arbitra-
tors are reluctant to modify the
discipline imposed by the employer.
Finding the LCA to be a “schedule of
penalties that was mutually agreed
to,” one arbitrator held any consider-
ation of the discipline imposed to be
beyond his authority.32  The same
arbitrator wrote in another case:
In my years as an arbitrator I have
never sustained a discharge, nor
can I recall reading the decision of
any other arbitrator sustaining a
discharge, over what seems to me
such a mild display of irritation.  In
many, if not most, organizations
such a minor outburst would pass
without any discipline whatso-
ever. . . .
However, in this case, the last
chance agreement removes from
me the authority to ask whether
the conduct involved is sufficiently
serious to warrant a termination,
if the last chance agreement
applies to the conduct involved.33
The arbitrator’s first obligation is
to be true to the parties’ agreements.
Arbitrators have no authority to
amend or ignore the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, in-
cluding agreements in the settlement
of grievances.  Where an arbitrator
considered the grievant’s “long years
of seniority” and reinstated him
subject to conditions substantially
identical to the LCA, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court and
remanded the case with instructions
to vacate the arbitrator’s award.34   The
court wrote:
[D]id the arbitrator have the
authority to disregard the explicit
terms of the prior settlement
agreement reached by the parties?
The district court held that the
arbitrator properly ignored the
settlement agreement because the
parties did not contemplate that
the settlement agreement would
constitute an amendment or
addendum to the collective bar-
gaining agreement.  Because the
settlement agreement did not
amend the collective bargaining
agreement, the argument goes,
the arbitrator retained his author-
ity to determine whether the
penalty imposed by the employer
under the settlement agreement
was too harsh. . . .
 Parties who reach a settlement
pursuant to a formal grievance
procedure have not bargained for
an arbitrator’s construction of the
collective bargaining agreement:
they have bargained for their own
7
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VII. The Last Chance Award
construction.
When a party claims that a prior
settlement agreement controls the
parties’ obligations, the policy in
favor of the finality of arbitration
must yield to the broader policy in
favor of the parties’ chosen method
of non-judicial dispute resolution.35
Arbitrators must assume that
every agreement between manage-
ment and the union is the result of an
arm’s-length negotiation. Because
both sides have alternatives, such
agreements cannot be considered the
product of duress or coercion.  This is
as true for agreements settling
grievances as it is for contracts.  A
grievant complaining that he was
coerced into signing the LCA because
the employer threatened to fire him is
no different than the criminal
defendant insisting he accepted the
plea bargain because he faced a longer
sentence if he went to trial.  In both
cases, a decision was made to accept
certain consequences.  The fact that
the alternative was to risk greater
consequences does not negate the
decision.
Not all last chance conditions are the
product of negotiations between the
parties.  Many times, the arbitrator
will reinstate an employee with the
admonishment that this is a “last
chance” for the employee to demon-
strate she can comply with the
employer’s rules; another way of
saying, “Go forth and sin no more.”
Some may be more specific, saying,
“Any repetition of this violation will
result in discharge.”36   While such
conditions are more often found in
cases where the arbitrator has held
that dismissal was excessive and the
employee is reinstated without back
pay, there may be circumstances
warranting last chance conditions
even though the discipline is totally
rescinded. In a case where the
employee was charged with a drug-
related offense, the arbitrator found no
basis for the dismissal and reinstated
the grievant with full back pay.
Because of the employee’s drug
history, however, the arbitrator
imposed a drug testing requirement
for two years, stating that the failure
to pass or take a test would subject the
employee to immediate discharge.37
 Conditions imposed by an arbitra-
tor often lack many of the elements of
an LCA, particularly specificity as to
what conduct is required or prohibited,
a reasonable and finite duration to the
conditions, and certainty as to the
consequences for future violations.
Consequently, such arbitral language
will not likely be given the same
weight as a last chance agreement by
a subsequent arbitrator.  It may serve
the purpose, though, of letting the
employee know that future infractions
could seriously jeopardize continued
employment.  Thus, it may provide the
same type of “wake-up call” that
management and the union try to
achieve through the LCA.  Addition-
ally, it may let a subsequent arbitrator
know that the employee has already
been given a stern warning, but to no
avail.
In other cases, the arbitrator may
impose conditions in the same manner
as the parties might have done.38
While arbitrators may not consider
themselves bound by conditions set by
a previous arbitrator, they may accept
the logic that the arbitration award is
just as much a part of the collective
bargaining process as the contract and
grievance settlement agreements.39
In one case, the arbitrator did not
impose last chance conditions, but
directed the parties to do so.  That case
involved poor performance by a
grievant who had long tenure and was
given mixed messages about his
performance. The arbitrator rein-
stated him without back pay
on a last chance basis, that he is
being given a final warning with
stated consequences, should he fail
to satisfactorily perform consis-
tently. . . . The final letter of
warning is to summarize, with
specifics, where continued and
sustained improvement is re-
quired in his job performance.  The
letter should go on to state that if
he fails to show immediate and
substantial continued satisfactory
work performance, he will be
subject to termination.  It is to be
made clear to [the grievant] that
this is a last chance for him to
prove . . . that he can consistently
bring his level of performance up to
that of the requirements of the job.
In connection with the final letter
of warning, [the grievant’s] perfor-
mance should be monitored and
reviewed periodically. Where nec-
essary, the result should be
communicated to [the Business
Representative] of the Union.40
The decision to impose last chance
conditions in a reinstatement award is
not always an easy one.  On the one
hand, the arbitrator may consider that
the management and union represen-
tatives have known the grievant much
longer than the day or two spent with
the arbitrator. The advocates are
experienced negotiators and could
have settled the dispute with a last
chance agreement if they felt it was
appropriate. Some advocates may
even prefer the arbitrator to sustain or
deny the grievance unconditionally.
On the other hand, the advocates
may have felt that a last chance
agreement was the best resolution, but
were unable to persuade the grievant
or management and  are looking to the
arbitrator to validate their positions.
Because offers of settlement are not
normally heard in arbitration proceed-
ings, this would not be known to the
arbitrator.
The last chance agreement is an
effective tool of discipline and griev-
ance resolution. To enhance the
VIII. Conclusion
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effectiveness of the LCA, the parties
should ensure that the terms of the
agreement are reasonable and appro-
priate to the situation, clear and
unambiguous, and fully explained to
the employee.  Both management and
the union have a responsibility to work
with the employee to ensure compli-
ance with the LCA’s conditions,
thereby maintaining the employee’s
continued employment relationship.
1. A comparison of the two most recent
editions of Elkouri and Elkouri, How
Arbitration Works illustrates the increas-
ing popularity of these agreements. The
fifth edition, published in 1997, covered
last chance agreements in only two para-
graphs. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRA-
TION WORKS 920 (Marlin M. Foltz & Edward
P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).The sixth
edition, published in 2003 expanded cov-
erage to more than four pages.  ELKOURI
& ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 969-73
(Alan Miles Rubin ed., 6th ed. 2003).  In
preparing this article, the author has fo-
cused upon more recent arbitration cases
on the theory that earlier decisions have
not been influenced by a body of arbitral
law and may not be representative of
current thought.
2. Kenneth Grinstead, The Arbitration
of Last Chance Agreements, 48 ARB. J.,
March 1993, at 71; Donald J. Petersen,
Last Chance Agreements, 52 DISPUTE RESOL.
J., Summer 1997 at 36.
3. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251
(1975).
4. The parties should define what types
of absences will count toward the maxi-
mum allowable number, but in no case
may they include absences covered by
the Family and Medical Leave Act. See
29 U.S.C. § 2615; 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a)(iii)(c).
5. See LTV Steel Mining Co., 110 L.A. 283
(Doepken, 1997). In this case, the LCA
conditions were based upon a diagnosis
of depression.  The grievant complied with
the treatment regimen, but when his
absenteeism triggered his termination, it
was found he had been misdiagnosed,
which resulted in his taking an inappro-
priate medication. The arbitrator found
the grievant’s dismissal lacked just cause
and directed that he be treated as if he
had been on sick leave.
6.This language reflects a composite of
LCAs the author has seen over the years
and last chance conditions he has ordered
in awards.
7. Makino, Inc., 114 L.A. 1110 (Donnelly,
2000).
8. Standard Products Co., 112 L.A. 1166,
1173 (Brodsky, 1999).  Another arbitra-
tor, however, held that giving lesser dis-
cipline does not repudiate or invalidate
the LCA.  Central Ohio Transit Author-
Notes
ity, 113 L.A. 1134 (Imundo, 2000).
9. Steelworkers v. Lukens Steel, 969 F.2d
1468, 1475 (3d Cir. 1992).
10. In some instances, the employer may
use last chance conditions as a form of
discipline in lieu of terminating the em-
ployee.  In Western Textile Products,
Greensteak, 107 L.A. 539 (Cohen, 1996),
the arbitrator enforced an LCA that was
signed by neither the grievant nor the
union, finding they were aware of the
LCA and the grievant at least tacitly
agreed to abide by the terms of the LCA
by his return to work.
11. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
12. Boise Cascade, 114 L.A. 1379, 1383
(Crider, 2000).
13. Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Co., 114 L.A.
297, 300 (Bickner, 1999).
14. See, e.g., Fort James Corp., 113 L.A.
742, 749 (Brown, 1999).
15.  Keystone Steel and Wire Co., 114 L.A.
1466, 1472 (Goldstein, 2000); see also
USS, 114 L.A. 44, 46-47 (St. Antoine
1999).
16. Steelworkers v. Lukens Steel, 969 F.2d
at 1475; Niro v. Fern Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d
173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987).
17. See, e.g., Lenzing Fibers Corp., 105
L.A. 423, 487 (Sergent, 1995); see also
Cross Refining Co., 111 L.A. 1013, 1023
(Bumpass, 1999).
18.Gencorp Auto , 104 L.A. 113, 117
(Malin, 1995).
19. Minnegasco Inc., 110 L.A. 1077, 1080
(Jacobowski, 1998).
20. Petersen, supra note 2, at 38.
21. U. S. Steel Corp., 120 L.A. 769, 771
(Vernon, 2004).
22. Central Ohio Transit Authority, 113
L.A. 1134, 1141 (Imundo, 2000).
23. Branch County Road Commission,
114 L.A. 1697, 1701 (Allen, 2000).
24.  International Paper Co., 109 L.A. 472,
477 (Terrill, 1997).
25.  Arbitrator Daugherty first set out the
“seven tests” of just cause in the railroad
industry in Award No. 8431 of the Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board, Third
Division, and then in Enterprise Wire Co.,
46 LA 359 (1966).
26. THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE
VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS, 174-75 (Theodore J.
St. Antoine, ed., 2d ed. 2005).
27. In ABTCO, Inc., 104 L.A. 551, 552
(Kanner, 1995), the arbitrator reached
the same conclusion, writing “A last
chance agreement is, in essence, the par-
ties’ agreement defining what is just
cause in respect to the grievant.”
28. Lenzig Fibers Corp., 105 L.A.. 423 ,427
(Sergent, 1995).
29. Central Ohio Transit Authority, 113
L.A. 1134, 1142 (Imundo, 2000);  Stan-
dard Products Co., 112 L.A. 1166, 1172
(Brodsky, 1999).
30. Lenzig Fibers Corp.,105 L.A. at 427.
31. ABTCO, Inc., 104 L.A. 551 (Kanner,
1995).
32. Napco, Inc., 111 L.A. 77 (Franckiewicz,
1998); see also Shuttleport, Inc., 117 L.A.
492 (Goldberg, 2002).
33. Hugo Bosca Co. , 109 L.A. 533,
539(Franckiewicz, 1997).
34.  Bakers Union Factory No. 326 v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 749 F.2d 350 (6th
Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 353-54.
36. Borden Italian Foods Co., 113 L.A.
13, 17 (Marino, 1999).
37. Aeronca, Inc., 112 L.A. 1063, 1072-73
(Duda, 1999).
38.  See, e.g., Anchor Hocking Glass Co.,
114 L.A. 1334, 1337 (Hewitt, 2000).
39. This author found no awards where a
prior last chance award was interpreted.
This may suggest that employees always
comply with last chance conditions when
they are imposed by an arbitrator, but
that is doubtful.
40. Glacier County Montana School Dis-






Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on develop-
ments under the equal employment
opportunity laws, the first Amend-




In Burlington Northern and Santa
Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct.
2405 (2006), the Supreme Court
adopted a broad definition of what
constitutes “retaliation” under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court held that any action taken
by an employer that could dissuade a
reasonable employee from engaging
in protected activity can constitute
retaliation, regardless of whether
the employee suffered tangible
harm.
Sheila White, a female forklift
operator, complained of sexually
disparaging remarks made by her
male supervisor.  As a result of
White’s complaint, the supervisor
was suspended and ordered to attend
sexual-harassment training.  At the
same time, White was reassigned
from operating a forklift to other
duties.
White filed a charge with the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging that she was
discriminated against on the basis of
her gender and retaliated against for
complaining about the alleged
discrimination.  White then filed a
second charge with the EEOC
Retaliation
alleging that her supervisor had
placed her under surveillance.  A short
time later, White had a disagreement
with her supervisor and was sus-
pended without pay.  Although White
was later reinstated and awarded
backpay, she filed another retaliation
charge with the EEOC.
After exhausting administrative
remedies, White sued in federal court
alleging that the change in her job
responsibilities and suspension
amounted to unlawful retaliation.  A
jury found in White’s favor and
awarded her $42,500 in damages.  The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
initially reversed the judgment but
later vacated its decision and heard
the case en banc.  The full court then
affirmed the district court’s judgment
in White’s favor. The Supreme Court
affirmed.
The Supreme Court distinguished
the anti-retaliation provision from the
general anti-discrimination provision
in Title VII, noting that the anti-
retaliation provision is not limited to
those harms that are related to
employment or that occur in the
workplace.  The  Court indicated that
the objective of the anti-retaliation
provision is to prevent employers from
interfering with the ability of
employees to secure enforcement of
Title VII’s basic guarantees. To
achieve this objective, the Supreme
Court found that the anti-retaliation
provision cannot be confined to harms
that affect terms and conditions of
employment.  Similarly, because Title
VII depends upon individual employ-
ees for its enforcement, a broad
interpretation of what constitutes
retaliation is consistent with the
statute’s enforcement scheme.
The Court defined actionable retali-
ation as any action which might
dissuade a reasonable employee from
filing or supporting a charge of
discrimination.  This definition, noted
the Court, will not immunize
employees from the “petty slights” and
“minor annoyances” common in the
workplace.  Rather, the definition
creates an objective legal standard
that takes into consideration the fact
that any given act of alleged
retaliation will often depend upon the
particular circumstances of the case.
First Amendment Develop-
ments
Scope of Protected Speech
In Garcetti  v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951
(2006), the Supreme Court held that
when public employees make state-
ments pursuant to their official duties,
they are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer disci-
pline.
Richard Ceballos, a deputy district
attorney for Los Angeles County,
informed his supervisors orally and
then in a written memorandum that
an affidavit used to obtain a search
warrant contained serious misrepre-
sentations.  Despite Ceballos’ con-
cerns, his supervisors proceeded with
the prosecution.  When called by the
defense, Ceballos recounted his mis-
givings about the affidavit.  The judge,
however, denied the defense’s motion
to suppress the warrant, explaining
that he found grounds independent of
the challenged material to show
probable cause for the warrant.
Ceballos filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
suit, claiming that his supervisors
retaliated against him for his memo
and his statements to them and the
court.  He was demoted to a trial
deputy; his only murder case was
reassigned to a junior colleague with
no experience in homicide prosecu-
tions; he was denied a promotion; and
he was transferred to another branch
of the office, which required a longer
commute.
Writing for the 5-4 majority,
Justice Kennedy drew upon previous
decisions that established that the
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First Amendment protects public
employees’ rights in certain circum-
stances.  Under Pickering v. Board of
Ed. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205,
391 U.S. 563 (1968), a two-part
inquiry is required to determine
whether an employee is speaking as a
citizen on a matter of public concern.
The first question is whether the
employee spoke as a citizen on a
matter of public concern.  If so, then
the possibility of a First Amendment
claim arises, and the inquiry becomes
whether the government entity had
adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other
member of the public.  The balance
that must be struck lies, on one hand,
in the nature of public employees as
holding positions of trust in society;
therefore, their speech that contra-
venes government policy may “impair
the proper performance of governmen-
tal functions.”  On the other hand, the
First Amendment cannot be used to
restrict the liberties that public
employees enjoy as private citizens.
The Court found that the disposi-
tive factor in Ceballos’ case was that
his speech was made pursuant to his
official duties. “Employers have height-
ened interests in controlling speech
made by an employee in his or her
professional capacity,” Kennedy wrote.
Failing to consider whether the speech
was made as a citizen or in the course
of official duty, as the Ninth Circuit
did (and led to a ruling for Ceballos),
would require a new, intrusive role for
state and federal courts “mandating
judicial oversight of communications
between and among government
employees and their superiors in the
course of official business.”  The Court
also suggested Ceballos’ proper re-
course was to other laws and labor
codes, such as whistleblower protec-
tions.
Justice Souter, in his dissent,
agreed that the Pickering balancing
scheme was appropriate to use.
However, he advocated for an
adjustment to the Pickering inquiry
in which private and public interests
in addressing official wrongdoing and
threats to health and safety could
outweigh the government’s stake in
efficient implementation of policy.  In
those cases, a public employee’s speech
made pursuant to his official duties
should be protected by the First
Amendment.  “[A] government pay-
check does nothing to eliminate the
value to the individual of speaking on
public matters, and there is no good
reason for categorically discounting a
speaker’s interest in commenting on a
matter of public concern just because
the government employs him.”  Souter
warned that the holding would lead to
moves by government employers to
expand stated job descriptions to
include more official duties so as to
exclude currently protected speech
from the First Amendment’s purview
(a consequence the majority rejected).
IELRA Developments
Confidential Employees
In Support Council of District 39,
Wilmette Local 1274, IFT-AFT v.
IELRB, 2006 Ill. App. LEXIS 539 (1st
Dist. June 26, 2006), the First District
Appellate Court held that a newly
created position of network manager
was excluded from the bargaining unit
as a confidential employee under
section 2(n)(ii) of the IELRA, 115 ILCS
5/2(n)(ii). The court based the exclu-
sion on the network manager’s
unfettered access to computer files,
including files containing confidential
information used in collective bargain-
ing and labor relations.
Wilmette School District 39 estab-
lished the new position of network
administrator and the union filed a
unit clarification petition to add it to
the bargaining unit. The IELRB
Executive Director found the position
to be that of an excluded confidential
employee. The IELRB affirmed with-
out precedent by a 2 to 2 vote, with one
member recusing herself.  The court
affirmed the IELRB.
The court reasoned that the
network manager had broad responsi-
bility for design and maintenance of
the district’s computer network,
including retrieving deleted files and
restoring deleted files.  This required
the manager to access files containing
confidential labor relations informa-
tion.  The court observed that when a
file is displayed on a computer screen,
it is virtually impossible to avoid
reading it.  The court rejected the
union’s argument that the district
could avoid giving the network
manager access to labor relations
information by storing such data on
removable disks.
The court relied on the plurality
IELRB opinion in Woodland Commu-
nity Unit School District No. 5, 16
PERI ¶ 1026 (IELRB 2000), which
excluded a newly created position of
technology coordinator as confidential.
The court distinguished the IELRB’s
decision in Lake County Area
Vocational System, 20 PERI ¶ 5
(IELRB 2004) which refused to exclude
two computer technicians from the
bargaining unit.  In Lake County, the
two employees had been in the
bargaining unit for a period of time and
finding them confidential would have




In Village of Niles and Metropolitan
Alliance of Police, Niles Police
Sergeants, Chapter 358, No. S-RC-04-
121 (ILRB 2006), the ILRB State Panel
remanded for further fact finding and
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Judge’s ruling that eight police
sergeants who had filed a representa-
tion certification petition were super-
visors within the meaning of section
3(r) of the IPLRA, 5 ILCS 315/3(r).  At
issue was whether the sergeants
possessed the authority to exercise one
or more supervisory functions enu-
merated in the Act that would affect
their subordinates’ employment by
issuing, or effectively recommending,
discipline.  
Citing Metropolitan Alliance of
Police v. ILRB, 362 Ill. App. 3d 469,
839 N.E.2d 1073 (3d Dist. 2005), the
State Panel employed a two-part test is
used to determine whether verbal
reprimands constitute discipline: 1)
they must be documented, and 2) they
must serve as the basis for future
discipline or otherwise affect the
officer’s terms and conditions of
employment.  The State Panel in-
structed the ALJ to re-examine
evidence to determine whether the
sergeants had the authority to issue,
as opposed to recommend, verbal
warnings.
A second dispositive issue concerned
whether the sergeants’ recommenda-
tions constituted evidence of the
supervisory authority to discipline.
The State Panel wrote that the
recommendation must be adopted as a
matter of course with little or no
independent review to meet the
standard, citing City of Peru v.
ISLRB, 167 Ill. App. 3d 284, 521
N.E.2d 108 (3d Dist. 1988). To
determine if that standard was met,
the panel instructed the ALJ to re-
examine the record for the following
factual findings: 1) the nature and
level of higher-level review, including
whether there was independent
investigation; 2) the number of
instances in which a sergeant’s
disciplinary recommendation resulted
in discipline, even if the specific
recommended discipline was not
imposed; and 3) the number of
instances in which the recommenda-
tions were made, and rejected.
Haraway, Willam M. & Kunselman,
Julie C.  ETHICAL LEADERSHIP
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRE-
TION: THE FIRE CHIEF’S HIR-
ING DILEMMA.   PUBLIC PER-
SONNEL MANAGEMENT.  Vol.
35, no. 1.  Spring 2006.  pp. 1-14.
The authors present a situation where
local government officials have to
struggle between exercising their
authority as public administrators to
reject an unqualified firefighter
candidate and submitting to political
pressure to hire the candidate.  Such
an ethical dilemma is a result of recent
efforts to reform government at the
federal, state, and local level.  Reforms
include passing more managerial
authorities and responsibilities to
local levels, instituting private-sector
managerial models, and privatizing
public services.  The authors argue
that administrative changes as a
result of reforms cause ethical
dilemmas for public administrators,
and this article illustrates how a fire
chief deals with such a dilemma.
Carson, Paula P., Carson, Kerry D.,
Birkenmeier, Betty, & Toma,
Alfred G.  LOOKING FOR LOY-
ALTY IN ALL THE WRONG
PLACES: A STUDY OF UNION
AND ORGANIZATION COMMIT-
MENTS.  PUBLIC PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT.  Vol. 35, no. 2.
Summer 2006.  pp. 137-151.
This article reports the results of an
interesting survey to examine organi-
zational satisfaction among unionized
public employees. The authors used
four categories of employees: a) com-
mitted to the union, b) committed to
the organization, c) committed to both
the organization and the union, and d)
uncommitted.  The results show that
public employees in categories (b) and
(c) have greater job satisfaction,
supervisory effectiveness, control over
work, and occupational identity,
compared to those in categories (a) and
(d).  The article presents other key
findings on such factors as promotion,
morale, and pay satisfaction. The
authors then offer practical sugges-
tions to both the union and the
organization to foster work satisfac-
tion.
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